The Privilege to Keep and Bear Arms:  The Second Amendment and Its Interpretation by Walker, William A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 88 Issue 6 
1990 
The Privilege to Keep and Bear Arms: The Second Amendment 
and Its Interpretation 
William A. Walker 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Second Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William A. Walker, The Privilege to Keep and Bear Arms: The Second Amendment and Its Interpretation, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 1409 (1990). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol88/iss6/8 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE PRIVILEGE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE SECOND AMEND-
MENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION. By Warren Freedman. New York: 
Quorum Books. 1989. Pp. x, 135. $39.95. 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.1 
Whether or not you read Guns & Ammo, listen to Guns 'n' Roses 
or see Top Gun, the pervasive presence of guns in American culture is 
unmistakable. At a time when the need to limit the proliferation of 
firearms (particularly those associated with criminal activity) seems 
more apparent than ever, opposition to such restrictions has never 
been greater.2 In The Privilege to Keep and Bear Arms, Warren Freed-
man3 sets out to "present[ ] the case for the anti-gun, anti-weapon, or 
anti-arms enthusiast" (p. ix). Following a common pro-regulation line 
of reasoning, Freedman's basis for arguing that firearm restrictions are 
constitutional is the assertion that the second amendment grants a 
"collective" rather than an "individual" right.4 Because the second 
amendment safeguards keeping and bearing arms in the context of pre-
serving a "well-regulated militia," he argues it is valid only to the ex-
tent that firearms are related to the collective activity of the militia of 
any given State. Therefore the right accrues to the States or State mili-
tia collectively, not to individual citizens. 
The courts have supported Freedman's theory to the extent that 
they consistently hold that firearms which bear no relation to the pres-
ervation of a well-regulated militia are within the purview oflegislative 
restriction. However, the cases fall short of foreclosing the possibility 
that the right is held or asserted by individuals (when personal arms 
are kept in furtherance of State militia activity).5 
The Privilege to Keep and Bear Arms is divided into eight chapters. 
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. II. 
2. See, e.g., Rierden, A Child's Shooting Death Compels His Mother to Action, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 19, 1989, § 23 (Conn. weekly), at col 1 (firearm death of child sparks personal gun control 
campaign); Some in N.R.A. Seek Expulsion of Bush. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1989, Al3, col.I 
(NRA members circulate petition to expel President Bush from the group due to his approval of 
a ban on imports of semiautomatic assault weapons). 
3. Attorney, and author of FEDERAL STATUTES ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1987); 
FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS (1988); FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS AND 
FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES (1987); THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE (1987); and 
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND ANTITRUST (1987). 
4. See generally Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amend-
ment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 206 (1983) (characterizing the traditional debate between the 
"state's right" view of anti-gun advocates and the "individual right" view of pro-gun advocates). 
5. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 266 (1886) (citizen was barred from asserting a per-
sonal right, in part, because he did not belong to an organized militia); United States v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 174 (1939) (same); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977) (defend-
ant's firearm must have connection to the militia in order to assert the right); Cases v. United 
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These are essentially different settings for discussion of the collective 
right theory of the second amendment, which runs throughout. The 
chapters include a phrase-by-phrase annotation of the second amend-
ment, a historical interpretation of the amendment's language, legisla-
tive and judicial treatment of gun control efforts, and theories of tort 
liability for gun manufacturers. Each is a step toward Freedman's 
stated mission: to provide "answers to the arguments set forth by the 
National Rifle Association and its satellites of members and of arms 
dealers who have products to sell," while making sure that the histori-
cal background to the second amendment is "nevertheless delineated 
as objectively as possible" (p. ix). 
Unfortunately, Mr. Freedman's own enthusiastic anti-weapon po-
sition proves to be a stumbling block both to his ability to delineate an 
objective history and to provide the most persuasive answers to pro-
gun arguments. While Freedman does present many strong argu-
ments for gun control, his ultimate effectiveness is hampered by two 
major problems: his apparent belief in the absurdity of the pro-gun 
position, and his insistence that the collective nature of the second 
amendment right controls the debate. 
I. A DISMISSAL OF PRO-GUN CLAIMS 
Freedman's conviction that private ownership of guns hinders 
rather than facilitates personal liberties6 (although plausibly correct) 
allows him to dismiss pro-gun arguments as absurd on their face, 
rather than disproving them explicitly. At times his argumentative 
style tends toward ad hominem attack rather than serious confronta-
tion of pro-gun claims. His initial reference to the NRA's "gun-toting 
members" (p. 19) gradually turns to "[t]he wishful thinkers favoring 
no control over guns" (p. 60), and later to "[t]hese same zealots" (p. 
60), and finally, he simply refers to them as "the zealots" (p. 61). 
While these people may actually be "zealots," Freedman's labeling 
them as such does not defeat their arguments. 
This confidence in the pro-gun lobby's patent absurdity hinders 
Freedman's ability to present the necessary counterarguments to its 
claims. For example, in the section which explores the application of 
the second amendment to the States via the fourteenth amendment, he 
cites authority indicating that only rights which are " 'implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty' " apply to the States through incorpora-
States, 131 F.2d 916, 923 (1st Cir. 1942) (defendant had no right to possess and use firearm "on a 
frolic of his own"). 
6. Freedman points to at least three ways in which guns threaten individual safety: first, the 
possibility that the presence of firearms could trigger an assault that otherwise would not occur; 
second, the possibility that firearms facilitate the commission of crimes that would not be possi-
ble without them; and third, the possibility that assaults with firearms will increase the severity of 
injury or deaths as compared to assaults without them. P. 6. 
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tion.7 Without elaboration, he then declares: "It is incredible that 
these zealots could compare the right to keep and bear arms with the 
'concept of ordered liberty,' much less argue that the Second Amend-
ment delineates 'immunities that are valid as against the federal gov-
ernment,' the very antithesis of the Second Amendment" (p. 61). 
Apart from indicating that gun enthusiasts are incredible zealots, 
his point is unclear. His own writing, as well as that of others, shows 
that the right to bear arms was, at least at one time, closely associated 
with the concept of ordered liberty.8 Mr. Freedman also fails to ex-
plain why the notion that "the Second Amendment delineates immuni-
ties that are valid as against the federal government" is the "very 
antithesis of the Second Amendment" (p. 61). In fact, it seems clear 
that what little power the second amendment holds is mainly directed 
at disabling the federal government from infringing on the right to 
bear arms. The more tenuous argument made by pro-gun forces. 
(which Mr. Freedman likely intended to discredit) is the assertion that 
the second amendment delineates immunities that are valid as against 
the States. (This is the question the chapter purports to address.) His 
willingness to let the outrageousness of "these zealot~" speak for itself 
makes his argument unintelligible. 
In his efforts to paint the pro-gun lobby as a band of gun-slinging, 
Wild-West cowboys, Mr. Freedman trivializes some of his own argu-
ments. He asserts that those who claim that self-defense is one of the 
purposes behind the right to bear arms, ''justify their conclusion by the 
uniquely American frontier experience of yesterday. Today, however, 
there is no such frontier, and people no longer depend upon guns for 
day-to-day survival" (p. 25). This argument is only valid as long as his 
implicit assertion (tl!at people don't need guns for self-defense) re-
mains unchallenged. Gun proponents are quick to claim, however, 
that people today are increasingly turning to gun ownership for self-
defense. 9 While this claim may not hold up to the counterargument 
that public safety is decreased rather than increased by the keeping of 
guns, 10 Freedman's flip dismissal of the self-defense argument as a 
7. P. 61 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
8. See p. 22 ("Formal state militia described in the Second Amendment was the vehicle to 
prevent the establishment of a standing federal army that could oppress the states and the citi-
zens thereof."); see also Beschle, Reconsidering the Second Amendment: Constitutional Protection 
for a Right of Security, 9 HAMLINE L. REv. 69, 82 (1986) ("It seems clear that the Framers 
envisioned a right of the people to bear arms to oppose an oppressive government."); Kates, 
supra note 4, at 230 (1983) (finding that the founders believed that self-defense was an inalienable 
right, and derived from it the right to resist tyranny, therefore making the right to bear arms 
"necessary to the security of a free state"). 
9. See Kates, supra note 4, at 268-69 (discussing the need for personal gun ownership as the 
police become less and less able to ensure safety). 
10. Many studies have shown that individual ownership of firearms increases the likelihood 
of personal injury or death rather than insuring personal safety. See, e.g., J. WRIGHT, P. Rossi & 
K. DALY, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 139-48 (1983) 
(collecting studies, but ultimately disagreeing with their conclusions); Zimring, Street Crime and 
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relic of bygone times avoids the entire issue. 
II. TOTAL ADHERENCE TO THE COLLECTIVE RIGHT THEORY 
The book's second problem is that Freedman's exclusive reliance 
on the "collective" right theory to justify constitutional gun control 11 
forces him into a corner where he must deny that any individual char-
acteristics of the right to bear arms ever existed. Unfortunately, the 
history of the second amendment seems to show that even if the right 
to bear arms were only applicable to weapons intended for collective 
use (i.e., the militia), it inhered in the individual. 
The militia at the time of the second amendment's adoption was 
comprised of every adult male, and each was expected to supply his 
own weapon and be on call for periodic duty. 12 Therefore, even if the 
right to keep and bear arms is only valid in the context of maintaining 
a well-regulated militia (as the case law implies), the right originally 
applied to the individual citizen who was required to keep his militia 
weapons at home.13 By refusing to credit even a partially personal 
aspect of what may be a largely collective right, Freedman is forced to 
deny a historical reality that virtually everyone (even himself, on occa-
sion) seems to acknowledge. Freedman ignores his own admission 
that the militia required individuals to supply their own guns (pp. 22, 
45), and baldly asserts that "the militia 'keep' arms in that the arms 
are not private property but belong to the governments" (p. 26). The 
statement appears to be his own linguistic interpretation since he offers 
no authority to back it up. 
Mr. Freedman is so emphatically opposed to conceding that the 
second amendment grants citizens any individual rights at all that he 
occasionally makes claims that cannot be supported. For example, in 
section 2.4 he interprets the second amendment language: "the right 
of the people," to mean: "at most a privilege" (pp. 25-26). His logic is 
as follows: 
[A] "right" can be qualified by reference to reasonableness, as illustrated 
by the Fourth Amendment, which balances the "right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" against "unreasona-
ble searches and seizures." The Second Amendment also balances the 
"right of the people" in the sense that collective action and not individ-
ual action is necessary to protect it. Thus, the entitlement is at most a 
"privilege" to keep and bear arms. [p. 26; footnote omitted] 
New Guns: Some Implications for Firearms Control, 4 J. CRIM. JUST. 95 (1976) (privately 
purchased firearms are likely to enter the stream of guns used in crimes). 
11. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
12. See Kates, supra note 4, at 214-15. Even Freedman himself admits that, in the first years 
after the passage of the Bill of Rights, the militia was defined as "the entire able·bodied military-
age male citizenry of the United States [which] required those males to own their own firearms." 
P. 22. 
13. See Kates, supra note 4, at 214-15. 
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His analogy to the fourth amendment clearly fails since that amend-
ment contains a reasonableness standard in the text, whereas the lan-
guage of the second amendment is most notable for its absoluteness 
("shall not be infringed").14 Furthermore, the "balance" he implies is 
not really a balance at all. The collective action to which he refers is 
presumably that of the state militia. Yet this collective action is not 
balanced against the right to bear arms, but rather defines the context 
in which the right exists at all. 15 
Additionally, Freedman makes assertions that may or may not be 
provable, but makes no attempt to support them. In his survey of the 
state constitutions that contain rights to bear arms, he lists fifteen 
states with provisions that (in their text) clearly give individuals a 
right to bear arms, and lists twenty-two other state constitutional pro-
visions as "holding to the collective right theory" (p. 29). Those 
which he claims adopt his "collective" theory include states which 
have provisions identical to the second amendment (and are therefore 
subject to the same debate which produced Mr. Freedman's book), 
and even one (Vermont) that provides that "the people have a right to 
bear arms for the defense of themselves and the state" (p. 30). While 
the case law in Vermont may hold this to give only a collective right, 16 
Freedman makes no indication of such treatment, and its language 
certainly appears to allow individual firearm possession for self-
defense.17 
* * * 
The Privilege to Keep and Bear Arms has a chapter on theories of 
tort liability against gun manufacturers and distributors. 18 While 
-
14. U.S. CoNST. amend. II; see also, Beschle, supra note 8, at 101-02 (noting that the use of 
the term "unreasonable" in the fourth amendment implies a balancing test). 
15. The only support Freedman uses to back up his assertion is a law review article which 
reads: "[T]he second amendment right of security is also an individual right, albeit one that 
requires collective action to protect it." Beschle, supra note 8, at 102. As noted above, this does 
not necessarily imply a balancing test, but rather argues that the individual right to bear arms 
can only be asserted if in conformity with collective (militia) activity. Also, it is interestingly in 
direct opposition to his claim that the second amendment grants a collective right. 
16. See State v. Duranleau, 128 Vt. 206, 260 A.2d 383 (1969) (question of individual nature 
of the right remains ambiguous). 
17. While it is perfectly possible that Mr. Freedman's assessment of these provisions is cor-
rect, his habit of omitting or glossing over seemingly important information gives even the sym-
pathetic reader the impression that Freedman is trying to deceive. The most egregious example 
is where he claims the 1968 Supreme Court case of Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), 
was "overruled in 1937 by Palko v. Connecticut," 302 U.S. 319 (1937). P. 61. While his argu-
ment did not depend on which overruled the other, it is a typical example of the kind of question-
able use of authority which, when coupled with his flippant tone, tends to discredit his position. 
18. The most notable among these are: the theory of negligent entrustment (holding manu-
facturers and dealers liable for reasonably foreseeable harm that will result from entrustment of 
certain firearms to certain people) (p. 94), a theory of strict liability for "ultrahazardous activi-
ties" (arguing that the risk of serious injury from handguns in particular warrants strict liability 
for all damages resulting from their use) (p. 101), and liability for "dispensing of firearms and 
guns to persons with criminal intent" (analogizing to dram shop acts imposing liability on servers 
of alcohol) (pp. 102-03). 
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these ideas are not completely new, 19 it is a fair sampling of some of 
the theories under which gun dealers may be held accountable, and 
victims of gun crimes may be compensated. The book concludes with 
a few words about what action should be taken to confront the prob-
lem of the proliferation of firearms. While Mr. Freedman's convic-
tions are certainly sincere, and he does present many valid theories 
under which strict gun control laws are consistent with the second 
amendment, he nevertheless falls short of his stated goal of providing 
"the answers" to many of the serious claims advanced by the pro-gun 
lobby. 
- William A. Walker 
19. See, e.g., Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Anal-
ysis, 73 GEO. L.J. 1437 (1985); Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of Handgun Crime: A 
Common Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1983). 
